Moore v. Texas: Balancing Medical Advancements With Judicial Stability by Taft, Emily
TAFT FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017 12:02 PM 
MOORE V. TEXAS: BALANCING 
MEDICAL 
ADVANCEMENTS WITH JUDICIAL 
STABILITY 
EMILY TAFT * 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 2016 election, voters in California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma 
reviewed the death penalty through referenda.1 The initiative in 
California, which was to remove the death penalty altogether, failed.2 
This was the second time that such a measure has failed there.3 
Oklahoma voters were deciding whether or not to preserve the death 
penalty within the state’s constitution.4 This constitutional amendment 
passed.5 In Nebraska, where voters were deciding whether to overturn 
the state legislature’s ban on the death penalty, the death penalty again 
prevailed.6 Public approval for the death penalty remains fairly high, 
and a pro-death penalty sentiment among the electorate seems to 
predominate.7 
The trend at the United States Supreme Court tells a different story. 
Generally, the Supreme Court has carved away at the death penalty 
with each new case it takes up.8 In Atkins v. Virginia,9 the Court 
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1.  Josh Sanburn, The Future of the Death Penalty Will Be Decided in These 3 States, TIME
MAGAZINE (Nov. 7, 2016), http://time.com/4561649/death-penalty-referendum-california-
nebraska/.  
2.  Id. 
3.  Liliana Segura, The Death Penalty Won Big on Election Day, But the Devil is in the
Details, INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/11/11/the-death-penalty-won-
big-on-election-day-but-the-devil-is-in-the-details/. 
4.  Id.
5.  Id.
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Elizabeth Schumacher, Texas on Trial for Using Fictional Character in Death Penalty
Cases, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 29, 2016), http://dw.com/p/2Rsq6.  
9.  536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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recognized that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of an 
individual who is intellectually disabled.10 In Hall v. Florida,11 the Court 
required that a State’s legal determination of intellectual disability 
must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic 
framework.”12 Because of continued public support, however, many 
believe that it will still be a while before the Court considers a 
nationwide ban.13 This was evident when the Court decided to hear 
Moore v. Texas.14 Initially, the Court considered addressing the 
constitutionality of the death penalty,15 but quickly limited review to 
one question: whether the Eighth Amendment requires States to 
adhere to a particular organization’s most recent clinical definition of 
intellectual disability in determining whether a person is exempt from 
the death penalty under Atkins and Hall.16 
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court should find for 
Texas because the state’s intellectual disability determination is 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment under Atkins and Hall.17 
Further, requiring states to change their frameworks based on the 
current medical definition at the time will cause judicial instability. Part 
I summarizes the factual and procedural history of Moore v. Texas, and 
Part II explains the legal background of the death penalty and 
intellectual disability. Part III presents the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals (CCA) holding and rationale, and Part IV explores the 
arguments set forth by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Part V then 
analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule on Moore based on the 
Court’s precedent and the associated policy implications. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 25, 1980, Petitioner Bobby James Moore and two other 
individuals robbed the Birdsall Super Market in Houston, Texas.18 
 
 10.  Id. at 320. 
 11.  134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  
 12.  Id. at 2000. 
 13.  Schumacher, supra note 8. 
 14.  Order Granting Cert., Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. June 6, 2016) [hereinafter Orde 
Granting Cert.]. 
 15.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-two-major-death-penalty-
cases.html?_r=1.  
 16.  Brief for the Respondent at i, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. Sept. 6, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 17.  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  
 18.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).  
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Moore supplied the weapons for the robbery and agreed to guard the 
courtesy booth while one of the accomplices planned to take the 
money.19 As they entered the store, one of the accomplices demanded 
money from the two clerks.20 Moore pointed a gun at the two clerks, 
causing one of the clerks to cry out that the store was being robbed.21 
Moore then pointed the gun at the clerk and shot him in the head.22 He 
died instantly.23 Moore and his accomplices quickly fled the scene.24 
Witnesses gave the police the license-plate number and a 
description of the getaway car, which allowed law enforcement to 
apprehend and arrest one of the accomplices.25 The car was searched, 
and the police found the other accomplice’s wallet, causing him to turn 
himself into the police.26 Based on interviews with the two accomplices, 
law enforcement issued a warrant for Moore’s arrest, but Moore 
evaded police until he was found at his grandmother’s house in 
Louisiana several weeks later.27 Moore admitted to the robbery and the 
clerk’s death, but insisted the death was an accident.28 The jury found 
him guilty of capital murder.29 At the punishment phase, Moore 
accepted the stipulation in his penitentiary packet, which outlined his 
medical and familial history, and the jury sentenced him to death.30 
Over the next twenty years, Moore filed several habeas corpus 
petitions, motions for a stay of execution, and applications alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but received no relief.31 
Then, in August 2002, “[d]espite having argued at the punishment 
retrial that [he] was not intellectually disabled[,] and having presented 
the testimony of two experts to support that theory,” Moore claimed 
that he was intellectually disabled and sought relief under Atkins.32 The 
CCA denied Moore’s motion to stay his execution until the Texas 
legislature responded to the Atkins ruling.33 On June 17, 2003, Moore’s  
 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 491. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 492. 
 31.  See id. at 492–504 (detailing Moore’s motions).  
 32.  Id. at 504. 
 33.  Id. 
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counsel filed a final habeas petition stating that he was intellectually 
disabled and thus could not be executed.34 However, Moore filed a pro 
se motion to waive further appeal and to set his execution date, and he 
refused any psychological examinations.35 The district court ordered 
that the habeas proceeding continue and appointed a pool of mental 
health experts for both parties to use.36 Moore put on three experts: two 
found him intellectually disabled, one did not; and the State put on one 
expert, who found him sane and competent.37 After a two-day Atkins 
hearing, the habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled 
and recommended that CCA grant relief on Moore’s Atkins claim, but 
the CCA denied relief.38 On June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.39 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Atkins v. Virginia 
The first case to address how states handle intellectual disability 
with regards to the death penalty was Atkins v. Virginia.40 In Atkins, the 
Supreme Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled 
individuals violates the Eighth Amendment.41 The Court found that 
while mentally disabled people should be tried and punished for their 
crimes, “their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control 
of their impulses” do not allow them to act with the “level of moral 
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.”42 The Court went on to say that the “dignity of man” is the 
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment,” and so the 
“Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”43 The Court 
 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 505. 
 36.  Id. at 506, 508–09. 
 37.  Brief for Petitioner at 8–10, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. July 28, 2016) [hereinafter 
Brief for Petitioner]. 
 38.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 513. 
 39.  Order Granting Cert., supra note 14.  
 40.  536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 41.  See id. at 317, 320 (prohibiting the execution of persons with intellectual disability, but 
leaving to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional 
restriction”). 
 42.  Id. at 306. 
 43.  Id. at 311–12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)). 
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concluded that “pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks 
to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an 
exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.”44 
The Court then noted that the medical community at the time had 
a three-factor definition of intellectual disability: (1) “significantly sub 
average intellectual functioning,” (2) “deficits in adaptive functioning 
(the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing 
circumstances),” and (3) “onset of these deficits during the 
developmental period.”45 Nevertheless, the Court left it to the states to 
determine the best way to enforce this constitutional restriction.46 
These state statutory definitions do not need to be identical, but must 
“generally conform to the clinical definitions.”47 After Atkins, some 
state courts and legislatures, including Texas, adopted the three-prong 
test outlined in Atkins, but others formulated their own standards.48 
B.  Hall v. Florida 
After Atkins, Florida implemented a rigid IQ cut-off for 
determining intellectual disability: “If, from test scores, a prisoner is 
deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual 
disability is foreclosed.”49 The Court in Hall v. Florida found that this 
rigid requirement “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with 
intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”50 
The Court considered the fact that only nine of the thirty-two states 
that allow the death penalty mandate a strict IQ cut-off, which suggests 
an “objective indicia of society’s standards” leaning away from a rigid 
IQ test.51 
Further, the Court considered the medical community’s 
understanding of intellectual disability.52 In Hall, the Court again 
stressed that state statutory definitions do not need to be identical, but 
do need to “generally conform to the clinical definitions” by stating 
that a state’s legal determination of intellectual disability must be 
 
 44.  Id. at 319. 
 45.  Id. at 308 n.3. 
 46.  See id. at 317 (internal citations omitted) (declaring that it left “to the States the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction”).   
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 25–27.  
 49.  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 1997. 
 52.  Id. at 2000. 
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“informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”53 The 
question that remained, which is addressed in Moore, is how closely 
state frameworks must conform to current medical standards for 
intellectual disability. 
Justice Alito, in his dissent in Hall, found that because the views of 
professional medical associations often change and fluctuate, “tying 
Eighth Amendment law to these views will lead to instability and 
continue to fuel protracted litigation.”54 
C.  The Current Situation in Texas 
The seminal case in Texas after Atkins was Ex parte Briseno.55 The 
CCA in Briseno adopted the definition of intellectual disability stated 
in Atkins and in the ninth edition of the American Association on 
Mental Retardation (AAMR) manual, published in 1992.56 Because it 
found that “determining what constitutes mental retardation in a 
particular case varies sharply depending upon who performs the 
analysis and the methodology used,” the court provided seven 
additional factors to assist courts in assessing death penalty habeas 
petitions: 
• Did those who knew the person best during the 
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, 
employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at 
that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that 
determination? 
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through 
or is his conduct impulsive? 
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is 
led around by others? 
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and 
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? 
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral 
or written questions, or do his responses wander from 
subject to subject? 
 
 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 55.  135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
 56.  Id. at 8 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON 
MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND 
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR 9th])). 
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• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or 
others’ interests? 
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness 
surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that 
offense require forethought, planning, and complex 
execution of purpose?57 
In Ex parte Cathey,58 the CCA explicitly stated that these “factors 
are not part of the definition of ‘intellectual disability,’ and trial and 
appellate courts may ignore some or all of them if they are not helpful 
in a particular case.”59 The Texas legislature has not taken up the issue 
of how to define intellectual disability, so the framework established in 
Briseno still stands as Texas’s legal framework today.60 
D.  The Current Situation in Other States 
Applying the “evolving standards of decency” test for the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court in both Atkins and Hall found the trends 
among the states probative to its decisions.61 Since Hall, most state 
courts have held that “current medical standards should be considered 
in resolving Atkins claims.”62 Today, four states have adopted the latest 
clinical definition of the American Psychological Association (APA) or 
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD) wholesale,63 while twenty-four states, including 
Texas, continue to use an earlier articulation of the test.64 
Furthermore, a majority of federal circuit courts have accepted that 
Atkins does not require any particular clinical definition as the legal 
standard.65 There is no consensus among states about which medical 
 
 57.  Id. at 8–9. 
 58.  451 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).  
 59.  Id. at 10 n.22. 
 60.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).  
 61.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014).  
 62.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 48; see, e.g., Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 467–68 
(Fla. 2015); State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 989–91 (Or. 2015); Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 
(Miss. 2015); cf. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270, 273–74 nn.4–5 (Pa. 2015) (holding that 
an Atkins claim resolved using AAIDD or DSM manual current at time of Atkins hearing). 
 63.  See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H) (2016) (adopting DSM-5); Chase 
v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 (Miss. 2015) (en banc) (adopting DSM-5 and AAIDD 11th); State v. 
Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 990 (Or. 2015) (adopting DSM-5); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270, 
273 (Pa. 2015) (approving AAIDD 11th as alternative to DSM-IV-TR). 
 64.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 17. 
 65.  Id. at 22; see Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); Chester v. Thaler, 
666 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Sasser v. Norris, 553 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by 
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012); Larry v. Branker, 552 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2009).  
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definition of intellectual disability should be used, but there is a 
consensus that medical expertise must be taken into account when 
determining intellectual disability in the context of the death penalty.66 
III.  HOLDING 
The CCA found that Moore is not intellectually disabled under the 
Briseno framework and thereby concluded that it is not 
unconstitutional to execute him.67 The CCA first determined that the 
Briseno framework remains adequately “informed by the medical 
community’s diagnostic framework.”68 In particular, the Briseno 
framework states: 
To demonstrate that he is intellectually disabled for Eighth 
Amendment purposes and therefore exempt from execution, an 
applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) 
he suffers from significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning, generally shown by an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 70 
or less; (2) his significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning is accompanied by related and significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning; and (3) the onset of the above two 
characteristics occurred before the age of eighteen.69 
The court noted that, while the AAIDD and APA have modified 
their definitions since Briseno, the authority to change the legal 
framework rests in the Texas legislature or the CCA, so the habeas 
court must follow the CCA’s precedent.70 
Next, the CCA analyzed each prong of the Briseno test to 
determine whether Moore is intellectually disabled. For the first prong, 
Moore has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
“ha[d] significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning.”71 
After careful analysis of the several IQ tests administered to Moore 
throughout his life and the positives and negatives of each type of test, 
the CCA determined that his Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC) IQ score of 78 and his Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
 
 66.  See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000 (“[T]his Court and the States have placed substantial reliance 
on the expertise of the medical profession.”).  
 67.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).  
 68.  Id. at 487 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000). 
 69.  Id. at 486; see Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Ex 
parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).  
 70.  See id. at 486 (holding that the habeas judge erred by employing the present definition 
used by the AAIDD). 
 71.  Id. at 514. 
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Revised (WAIS-R) IQ score of 74 accurately and fairly represented his 
intellectual functioning.72 Applying the standard error of measurement 
(SEM), the CCA determined Moore’s SEM IQ range to be 73 to 83.73 
For the second prong, Moore had “not proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he has significant and related limitations in adaptive 
functioning.”74 After reviewing each of the experts’ findings, the CCA 
found that Dr. Kristi Compton’s assessment that Moore was not 
intellectually disabled was the most credible and reliable.75 Further, the 
CCA found that the non-clinical Briseno factors “weigh[ed] heavily 
against a finding that applicant’s adaptive deficits, of whatever nature 
and degree they may be, [were] related to significantly sub-average 
general intellectual functioning.”76 Concerning the third prong, the 
CCA found that he had not established that he was intellectually 
disabled before the age of eighteen.77 Thus the CCA upheld Moore’s 
execution because he failed to show that he suffered “from significantly 
sub-average general intellectual functioning” or that any significant 
deficits in his adaptive behavior were “related to significantly sub-
average general intellectual functioning.”78 
In her dissent, Judge Elsa Alcala argued that the CCA was 
effectively using a strict IQ cut-off and merely cherry-picked the scores 
it desired.79 She further argued that “[i]n light of both Atkins and Hall, 
a court reviewing an intellectual-disability claim is compelled to consult 
current medical standards in determining whether a particular offender 
falls within the medical definition of an intellectually disabled 
person.”80 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Moore’s Arguments 
Moore argues that the legal framework in Texas established under 
Briseno does not consider current medical expertise and therefore 
violates the Eighth Amendment.81 Moore has three primary arguments 
 
 72.  Id. at 517–19. 
 73.  Id. at 519.  
 74.  Id. at 520. 
 75.  Id. at 524–25. 
 76.  Id. at 526. 
 77.  Id. at 527. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 529, 535 (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
 80.  Id. at 531 (Alcala, J., dissenting). 
 81.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 49. 
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supporting his claim that his execution must be overturned. 
First, Moore argues that when courts determine intellectual 
disability by ignoring current standards, they violate the Eighth 
Amendment.82 According to Moore, Atkins does not give states 
“unfettered discretion”83 in defining the scope of intellectual disability; 
rather Atkins and Hall “made clear that (1) the Eighth Amendment-
mandated inquiry into intellectual disability must be informed by the 
medical diagnostic framework and (2) the medical diagnostic 
framework is determined by current medical standards.”84 Additionally, 
Moore highlights the practical problems associated with states applying 
past standards, namely that medical experts would need to diagnose 
and evaluate individuals artificially based on old standards.85 
Second, Moore argues that even if prohibiting the use of current 
medical standards in intellectual disability determinations in death 
penalty cases is acceptable under Atkins and Hall, it still violates the 
Eighth Amendment.86 According to Moore, the CCA conflicted with 
the “medical community’s ‘diagnostic framework,’ by (1) rejecting 
consideration of current medical standards and (2) relying on its own 
clinically unsound Briseno factors.”87 The CCA allegedly erred when it 
put too much weight on the IQ cut-off to determine intellectual 
functioning88 and erred when it required Moore “to prove that his 
deficits in adaptive functioning were caused specifically and exclusively 
by his intellectual deficits.”89 
Third, Moore argues that the non-clinical Briseno factors used by 
the CCA conflict with current medical consensus.90 According to 
Moore, the Briseno factors “arose from the CCA’s explicit distrust of 
the clinical framework, which it viewed as “exceedingly subjective.”91 
“By relying on lay impressions, stereotypes and non-diagnostic criteria, 
the Briseno standard risks allowing the execution of individuals with 
intellectual disability—like Moore—whose impairments, though 
constitutionally significant, may be less obvious and less severe than 
 
 82.  Id. at 27. 
 83.  See id. at 29. 
 84.  Id. at 30. 
 85.  Id. at 31. 
 86.  See id.  
 87.  Id. at 32 (internal citations omitted). 
 88.  Id. at 36. 
 89.  Id. at 46. 
 90.  Id. at 49. 
 91.  Id. at 50. 
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those of other individuals.”92 While Texas states that the Briseno factors 
are merely an optional aspect of the analysis,93 Moore argues that the 
CCA erroneously used the factors too heavily in its determination and 
that lower courts have often relied exclusively on them in making 
intellectual disability determinations.94 
B.  Texas’s Arguments 
Texas argues that the CCA correctly analyzed and determined that 
Moore is not intellectually disabled, and thus it is not unconstitutional 
for the state to execute him.95 Texas further argues that the CCA did 
not prohibit the use of current medical standards and that Moore’s 
actual grievance is that he disagrees with the CCA’s determinations of 
the most reliable IQ scores and most credible medical expert.96 Texas 
offers four arguments that its legal framework defining intellectual 
disability remains constitutional. 
First, Texas argues that its definition of intellectual disability 
adheres to Atkins.97 According to Texas, Atkins did not require states to 
adopt a certain definition for intellectual disability,98 and Hall did not 
abolish the states’ role in determining intellectual disability for Atkins 
claims.99 The state of Texas specifically adopted and continues to use 
the definition from the ninth edition of the AAMR, which is directly 
cited in Atkins.100 Additionally, Texas points out that there is no 
nationwide consensus among the states as to which clinical definition 
ought to be used.101 Further, “[r]equiring States to strictly adhere to 
either the APA’s or AAIDD’s latest clinical definition would be 
unworkable and unwarranted” because medical organizations’ clinical 
definitions differ among themselves.102 Finally, Texas argues that its 
legal framework, as laid out in Briseno, remains adequately “informed 
by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”103 Texas claims 
 
 92.  Id. at 57. 
 93.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 52.  
 94.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2016) (citing 
Ex parte Sosa, 364 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).  
 95.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 19.  
 96.  Id. at 2.  
 97.  Id. at 19. 
 98.  Id. at 21. 
 99.  Id. at 22. 
 100.  Id. at 33. 
 101.  Id. at 25. 
 102.  Id. at 27–28. 
 103.  Id. at 36 (citing Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993, 2000 (2014) (emphasis omitted)). 
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that the medical standards have not changed significantly enough or 
uniformly to warrant a change in its legal framework.104 Further, 
because Texas courts rely heavily on medical experts in determining 
each individual case, the most up-to-date standards influence each 
decision.105 
Second, Texas argues that the CCA properly found Moore did not 
adequately show he was intellectually disabled.106 Concerning the first 
prong of the legal framework, Texas argues that the CCA correctly 
narrowed down the list of IQ scores to the most reliable in determining 
Moore’s intellectual functioning.107 Concerning the second prong, 
Texas argues that the CCA correctly based its findings on the expert 
testimony of Dr. Compton.108 Because the experts varied in their 
assessments of Moore, the CCA relied primarily on Dr. Compton 
because her “qualifications and depth of review made her expert 
opinion the most credible.”109 Concerning the third prong, Texas argues 
that Moore “failed to meet his burden to show that his asserted 
adaptive functioning deficits are directly ‘related’ to his asserted 
intellectual functioning deficits”110 because when the factors affecting 
Moore’s adaptive functioning were removed from his life due to 
imprisonment, he “showed ‘significant advances’ in adaptive 
behavior.”111 
Third, Texas argues that the non-clinical Briseno factors do not 
render its three-prong framework unconstitutional.112 According to 
Texas, the Briseno factors are an optional inquiry to assist courts in 
determining an individual’s adaptive functioning, and were used in this 
case merely to bolster the CCA’s determination that Moore is not 
intellectually disabled.113 
Finally, Texas argues in the alternative that, if the Court determines 
that Texas’s legal framework does not adequately consult current 
medical standards, then the Court should establish a national Atkins 
standard and remand the case for further review by the CCA.114 Texas 
 
 104.  Id. at 31.  
 105.  Id. at 35–36.  
 106.  Id. at 38. 
 107.  Id. at 41. 
 108.  Id. at 44.  
 109.  See id. at 45–46 (discussing the weights given to the experts). 
 110.  Id. at 48. 
 111.  Id. at 49 (citation omitted).  
 112.  Id. at 51. 
 113.  Id. at 52–53. 
 114.  Id. at 50–51. 
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argues that even if a new standard were adopted, Moore would still be 
found not to be intellectually disabled based on the expert testimony 
already set forth.115 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold for Texas and rule that Texas’s legal 
framework for determining intellectual disability with regards to the 
death penalty adequately conforms to medical standards and thus 
follows Atkins and Hall. Holding for Texas would respect the Court’s 
precedent established in Atkins and Hall and ensure greater judicial 
stability in the face of ever-changing medical standards. Finally, the 
trend among the states regarding intellectual disability and the death 
penalty shows that the current consensus of decency encompasses 
Texas’s legal framework. 
A.  Atkins and Hall Support a Finding for Texas 
In Atkins, the Court explicitly left it to the states the ability to 
determine “appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 
upon [their] execution of sentences.”116 The only caveat was that states 
must “generally conform” to clinical definitions and standards.117 In Ex 
parte Briseno, Texas established that an intellectual disability “is a 
disability characterized by: (1) ‘significantly subaverage’ general 
intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’ limitations in 
adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs prior to the age of 
18.”118 Thus, Texas did just as the Court required in Atkins when it 
adopted the definition from the ninth edition of the AAMR, which was 
cited in Atkins,119 as its legal framework for determining intellectual 
disability. 
In Hall, the Court did not take away the states’ discretion to 
establish their own definition for intellectual disability.120 Although 
Hall described clinical definitions as “a fundamental premise of 
Atkins,” it did not require states to adopt an identical, current medical 
standard.121 “The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct 
 
 115.  Id. at 39.  
 116.  536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 117.  Id. at 317 n.22. 
 118.  135 S.W.3d 1,7 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting AAMR 9th, supra note 56, at 5) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.  
 119.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308, n.3.  
 120.  134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014). 
 121.  See id. at 1998.  
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from a medical diagnosis,” so medical standards do not completely 
dictate an Atkins claim.122 The issues with Florida’s intellectual 
disability definition in Hall was that it employed a “strict IQ test score 
cutoff of 70” and that it treated all individuals on a strict number basis 
rather than using a SEM range.123 Here, the CCA narrowed Moore’s IQ 
scores to those that the experts found to be a reliable expression of his 
intellectual functioning and then used SEM to form his IQ range.124 
This range fell above the 70-score line set forth in the definition from 
the ninth edition of the AAMR.125 The inquiry did not stop at Moore’s 
IQ score, however, but rather the CCA went on to analyze additional 
evidence of Moore’s intellectual capacity and adaptive functioning 
through the testimony of family, friends, and current medical experts.126 
Further, Moore’s claim that the CCA refused to consult any current 
medical standards is incorrect. Several experts testified concerning 
Moore’s intellectual and adaptive functioning.127 These experts applied 
current medical standards as they assessed and analyzed Moore’s 
mental capacity,128 so these current standards came into play through 
the testimony of the experts. 
Finally, the non-clinical Briseno factors are merely an optional tool 
that Texas courts may employ to help assess an individual’s adaptive 
functioning. As stated above, the CCA has explicitly stated that these 
“factors are not part of the definition of ‘intellectual disability,’ and trial 
and appellate courts may ignore some or all of them if they are not 
helpful in a particular case.”129 Rather, these factors merely help guide 
courts through the three-prong test. 
B.  The Trend Among the States 
In Atkins and Hall, the Court considered the death penalty 
practices of the thirty-two states that allow the death penalty to 
determine society’s view of the “standards of decency” associated with 
 
 122.  See id. at 2000 (“[T]his determination is informed by the views of medical experts. These 
views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not disregard these informed 
assessments.”). 
 123.  See id. at 1994–96 (“[T]aking the SEM into account . . . acknowledg[es] the error 
inherent in using a test score without necessary adjustment.”). 
 124.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 518–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 
 125.  Id. at 486.  
 126.  Id. at 520.  
 127.  See id. at 520–24 (describing the experts’ testimony). 
 128.  See id. at 504–05, 509 (stating that each expert used “the tenth (2002) edition of the 
AAMR Manual or the DSM-IV, or both”). 
 129.  Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 10 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
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the Eighth Amendment.130 Most states believe that current medical 
standards should be consulted when determining whether an individual 
is intellectually disabled. Although only four states today have 
established the most recent definitions of the APA or AAIDD, twenty-
four states continue to use past definitions similar to the one adopted 
by Texas.131 Even though there is not a complete consensus, a significant 
majority of states that allow the death penalty have not adopted the 
most current medical standards to determine intellectual disability.132 
This near consensus provides an “objective indicia of society’s 
standards”133 that strongly suggests Texas’s legal framework is 
constitutional. Under the Eighth Amendment, “what counts are our 
society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American 
people—not the standards of professional associations, which at best 
represent the views of a small professional elite.”134 
C.  Policy Implications Support a Finding for Texas 
If the Court holds for Moore, states would have to continually 
update their legal frameworks to address changes in a field that is 
perpetually in flux.135 As there is no consensus among medical 
professionals and organizations about the proper definition for 
intellectual disability,136 states would have to determine which medical 
standard is the “correct” standard at the time.137 For example, the 
 
 130.  See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014). The Court found: 
[A]t most nine States mandate a strict IQ score cutoff at 70. Of these, four States 
(Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington) appear not to have considered 
the issue in their courts. On the other side of the ledger stand the 18 States that have 
abolished the death penalty, either in full or for new offenses, and Oregon, which has 
suspended the death penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40 years. In 
those States, of course, a person in Hall’s position could not be executed even without 
a finding of intellectual disability. Thus in 41 States an individual in Hall’s position—an 
individual with an IQ score of 71 — would not be deemed automatically eligible for the 
death penalty. 
Id. at 1996 (internal citations omitted). 
 131.  See supra Part II.D.  
 132.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 133.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).  
 134.  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (Alito, J. dissenting).  
 135.  See id. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach implicitly calls upon the 
Judiciary either to follow every new change in the thinking of these professional organizations or 
to judge the validity of each new change.”). 
 136.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 31.  
 137.  See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach requires the 
Judiciary to determine which professional organizations are entitled to special deference. And 
what if professional organizations disagree? The Court provides no guidance for deciding which 
organizations’ views should govern.”). 
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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) stated that it will be “re-
orienting its research away” from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) categories.138 Another example is the most 
recent publication of the APA, which drastically changes the first prong 
of the longstanding, three-pronged framework of intellectual disability 
established in the ninth edition of the AAMR and adopted by most 
states.139 Furthermore, sometimes changes made by medical 
associations are rescinded several years later.140 As medical 
advancements continue, grave judicial instability may ensue. And, this 
instability will only fuel long drawn-out litigation and extend the 
amount of time someone spends on death row. 
The Court should allow states to keep their legal frameworks as 
they stand, at least until a significant trend in medical research points 
to a substantially different definition of intellectual disability. Trial 
courts and appellate courts rely on expert testimony in determining 
whether an individual is intellectually disabled.141 These experts will 
generally be trained in the current medical standards and will employ 
these standards as they evaluate each individual. Thus, Texas’s legal 
framework is designed to bring in current medical standards through 
the consultation of experts. This will better balance the ever-changing 
medical field with the need for judicial stability. Judicial stability 
requires the Court to find for Texas. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Moore v. Texas will be critical concerning the 
stability of death penalty cases moving forward. The Supreme Court 
should find for Texas because the state’s intellectual disability 
determination follows the precedent set in Atkins and Hall. Further, 
because the medical field is so fluid, requiring states to constantly 
change their frameworks will cause judicial instability. Here, Moore was 
unable to meet his burden of proving that he was intellectually disabled 
under the standard set forth in Atkins and adopted by Texas in Briseno. 
 
 
 138.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 31. 
 139.  See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In this new publication, the APA 
discards ‘significantly subaverage intellectual functioning’ as an element of the intellectual-
disability test.”). 
 140.  See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is also noteworthy that changes adopted by professional 
associations are sometimes rescinded[.]”). 
 141.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 40. 
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While the Court has typically limited the application of the death 
penalty through its cases, this case should keep the status quo intact. 
With the Court limiting its review of the case to only one question142 
and with the trend in the recent election suggesting continued public 
support for the death penalty,143 the Court will likely be disinclined to 
carve out a deeper intellectual disability exception to the death penalty. 
 
 142.  See Liptak, supra note 15. 
 143.  See Segura, supra note 3 (discussing how various states have continued to pass death 
penalty statutes).  
